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NOTES
follow adoption of the dissent, it is to be hoped that North Dakota
will follow the rule of this case.45  GORDON THOMPSON.
NEGLIGENCE - CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE - THE DOCTRINE OF
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE. - There is a pronounced trend in this
country today toward the adoption of damage apportionment or
"comparative negligence" acts. In 1951, for instance, legislation to
that effect was introduced in sixteen states.' The reason for the
present trend probably lies in the great post-war increase in auto-
mobile accidents, the litigation arising therefrom, and the corres-
ponding need for aiding the uncompensated victims. In view of the
growing prominence of the doctrine of comparative negligence, it
seems desirable that any discussion of it should include at least
some background, by way of a brief treatment of the doctrine of
contributory negligence, its modifications and the beginnings of
comparative negligence-followed by a judicial and legislative
history of the doctrine of comparative negligence, as well as a dis-
cussion of some of the problems it entails.
Contributory Negligence
The doctrine of contributory negligence was born with the Eng-
lish case of Butterfield v. Forester.2 Plaintiff, riding away from the
public tavern at a furious pace, failed to observe a pole the defend-
ant had left lying across the road and rode into it. He was subse-
quently disallowed recovery for his injuries on the theory that he
had contributed to his own harm by failing to use common and
ordinary caution.
In 1824 the doctrine was accepted in America. 3 It has operated,
essentially, to preclude a plaintiff from recovery where his act
contributed as an efficient or "proximate" cause to his own injury.4
45. Care must be used in the preparation of the pleadings, in order to bring the action
within the provisions of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. In the case of Irwin
v. Meese, 325 Mich. 344, 38 N.W.2d 867 (1949), an equitable action was brought to
enjoin the transfer of assets, previous to the adjudication of a tort claim. Plaintiff's
counsel evidently overlooked the Uniform Act in the theory of the case, for the Act, in
effect in Michigan at the time, was not pleaded. The Supreme Court of Michigan re-
fused to enjoin the transfer, although it was perfectly obvious that if the Uniform Act
had been pleaded, the transfer would have been ruled a fraudulent conveyance.
1. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 Calif. L. Rev. 1 n.1, citing Lipscomb,
Comparatice Negligence, 344 Ins. L.J. 667. The sixteen states are: Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New York, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah and Washington.
2. 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809).
3. Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. 621 (1824).
4. Cleveland By. Co. v. Halterman, 22 Ohio App. 234, 153 N.E. 922 (1926);
MeLeod v. City of Spokane, 26 Wash. 346, 67 Pac. 74 (1901).
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Nor are the plaintiff's damages merely mitigated by his acts; "pre-
cluded" means what it says.' It is worth noting that a few juris-
dictions transfer the burden of proof to a plaintiff so that he must
plead and prove freedom from contributory negligence. 6 Consider-
ation of the parties as practically in pari delicto, however, is the
principal feature of the doctrine.
Supporters of the theory of contributory negligence say that it
tends to make people more cautious through their knowledge that
a plaintiff is responsible for his own safety; conversely, it has been
said that such a rule encourages negligence since a defendant is
allowed to escape the consequences of his own wrongful act.7 Both
arguments seem fallacious. It is improbable that the average motor-
ist, for instance, stops to reflect on the possibilities of liability or
litigation when confronted with an impending accident! At any
rate the defense of contributory negligence has become consider-
ably less popular that it was at common law."
Certain modifications of and exceptions to the doctrine have
resulted from the growing dissatisfaction it has inspired. The rule
that contributory negligence is no defense to an action to recover
for injury caused by a defendant's "wilful negligence,"' the impo-
sition of absolute liability in cases of violation of certain statutes by
the defendant, 10 and the last clear chance doctrine are examples.
The latter, sometimes called the "jackass doctrine," originated with
Davies v. Mann." In that case the plaintiff was allowed to recover
for injuries inflicted on his donkey (left fettered on the highway)
by the defendant's vehicle, on the theory that because the defend-
ant had the last clear chance to avoid the harm, the plaintiff's own
negligence was not a proximate cause of the injury. Although the
doctrine has been thought to be a step toward apportionment of
damages (i.e. what is known as "comparative negligence"), in
5. Rice v. Crescent City R. Co., 51 La. Ann. 108, 24 So. 791 (1899).
6. Green, Illinois Negligence Law, 39 Il1. L. Rev. 116, 125 n.33 (1945). In Iowa,
for instance, the burden is on the plaintiff except as to employees and passengers.
7. Lowndes, Contributory Negligence, 22 Geo. L.J. 674, 681 (1934).
8. See Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 202 Minn. 425, 430, 281 N.W. 261, 263
(1938).
9. Ziman v. Whitley, 110 Conn. 108, 147 Atl. 370 (1929); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.
Co. v. Baker, 79 Kan. 183, 98 Pac. 804 (1908); Mihelich v. Butte Electric Ry. Co., 85
Mont. 604, 281 Pac. 540 (1929).
10. Terry Dairy Co. v. Nalley, 146 Ark. 448, 225 S.W. 887 (1920) (brought under
child labor act); Bennet Drug Store v. Mosely, 67 Ga. App. 347, 20 S.E.2d 208 (1942)
(sale of poison to a person who knows its character); Dusha v. Virginia & Rainy Lake
Co., 145 Minn. 171, 176 N.W. 482 (1920) (brought under a child labor act); Pizzo v.
Wiemann, 149 Wis. 235, 134 N.W. 899 (1912) (prohibiting the sale of dangerous
'articles to ninors).
11. 10 M. & W. 546, 125 Eng. Rep. 588 (1842).
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reality it has been an extremely confused and misapplied doctrine.12
One leading writer, concluding his discussion of "last clear chance,"
has said: "This variety of irreconcilable rules, all purporting to be
the same, and the lack of any rational fundamental theory to sup-
port them, suggest that the 'last clear chance' doctrine is more a
matter of dissatisfaction with the defense of contributory negligence
than anything else."'- Other modifications of the rule of contribu-
tory negligence include a rule of strict liability in cases of extra-
hazardous activities by the defendant,'14 and holdings that the
keeping of vicious animals by a defendant bars his right to the de-
fense of contributory negligence. 1
The foregoing "modifications" benefited the doctrine of contribu-
tory negligence in a peculiar fashion. While insuring a plaintiff
that he would be "equitably" treated, they made the defendant
absolutely liable-with few exceptions. Thus there seemed to be
no point in compromise: in some circumstances a plaintiff could
recover regardless of his own negligence; in others his negligence
would bar his recovery. That the answer to the thorny problems
involved seemed to lie in damage apportionment or comparative
negligence was fervently voiced by a Minnesota court.t A sort of
apportionment, of course, has often been made by juries which
disregard any instructions regarding contributory negligence and
award the negligent plaintiff diminished damages. The courts of
admiralty in collision cases have long divided damages between
the negligent parties. 17 Not until 1908, however, was there adopted
any real system of apportionment of damages in the American laws
of negligence.
Comparative Negligence
In 1908, the Federal Employer's Liability Act was passed.' 8 It
12. Prosser, supra note 1, at 7; see also Note, 26 N.D. Bar Briefs 30 (1950).
13. Prosser, Torts 416 (1941).
14. Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal.2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948); Whitman Hotel Corp. v.
Eliott & Watraus Eng. Co., 137 Conn. 562, 79 A.2d 591 (1951).
15. Tidal Oil Co. v. Forcum, 189 Okla. 268, 116 P.2d 572 (1941); Moore v. McKay,
55 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
16. Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 202 Minn. 425, 430, 281 N.W. 261, 263 (1938)
"No one can appreciate more than we the hardship of depriving plaintiff of his verdict and
of all right to collect damages from defendant; but the rule of contributory negligence,
through no fault of ours remains in our laws and gives us no alternative other than to
hold that defendant is entitled to judgement notwithstanding the verdict. It would be
hard to imagine a case more illustrative of the truth that in operation the rule of compara-
tive negligence would serve justice more faithfully than that of contributory negligence."
17. White Oak v. Boston Canal Co., 258 U.S. 341 (1922); The Eugene F. Moran,
212 U.S. 466 (1909); The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302 (1876).
18. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§51-60 (1946); see Edwards v.
Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 131 F.2d 266 (7th Cir. 1942); Grand Trunk Western R. Co.
v. Boylen, 81 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1936).
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provided for apportioning damages in all negligence actions, in
federal or state courts, involving injuries to railroad employees em-
ployed in interstate commerce. Section 53 of the Act reads:
"In all actions hereafter brought against any such common
carrier by railroad under or by virtue of any of the provisions
of this chapter to recover damages for personal injuries to an
employee, or where such injuries have resulted in his death, the
fact that the employee may have been guilty of contributory
negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be
diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negli-
gence attributable to such employee; Provided: That no such
employee who may be injured or killed shall be held to have
been guilty of contributory negligence in any case where the
violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted for
the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of
such employee.'''
Subsequent to the passage of the Act several states adopted exact
or similar provisions in state "employer's liability acts."20 Some
states passed other types of comparative negligence statutes as
well, limiting their scope to special classes or circumstances." All
of the foregoing legislation concerning comparative negligence,
however, is of a relatively minor nature in any general treatment of
the subject. A discussion of major judicial and statutory develop-
ments follows.
Developments in Case Law
It is interesting to note that several American jurisdictions have
at one time or another employed the theory of comparative negli-
gence. From 1858 with the case of Galena & Chicago Union Rail-
road Company v. Jacobs'22 until 1894, Illinois followed a "hybrid"
system of comparative negligence by which the plaintiff whose
negligence was slight in degree could recover his total damages
19. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§51-60 (1946).
20. Ark. Stat. Ann. §73-916 (1947); Colo. Stat. Ann. c. 139, §87 (2) (1935);
Iowa Code Ann. §§479-124 and 479-125 (1949); Kan. Gen. Stat. §66-238 (1949); Ky.
Rev. Stat. §277.320 (1950); Minn. Rev. Laws §72-649 (1947); Mich. Comp. Laws
§419.52 (1948); Neb. Rev. Stat. §74-704 (1943); N.C. Gen. Stat. c. 60 §67 (1943);
N.D. Rev. Code §49-1603 (1943); Ohio Gen. Code Ann. §9018 (Page, 1945); S.C. Code
§8376 (1942); S.D. Code §52.0945 (1939); Tex. Div. Stat. Ann. art. 6440 (Vernon,
1949); Va. Code Ann. §5792 (1942); Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. §65-502 (1945).
21. Ariz. Code Ann. §56-801 (determines classes of employees benefited, i.e., rail-
road, manufacturing, mining, milling, etc.), §56-805 (proclaims comparative negligence
as applicable in the above cases) (1933); Cal. Lab. Code §2801 (1937) (covers all
employees); Fla. Stat. §769 (1941) (relates to hazardous employment and apportion-
ment of damages between parties unless employee was injured by a fellow servant).
22. 20 Ill. 478 (1858).
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from a defendant whose negligence was gross in comparison.2 3 The
lack of any actual apportionment of damages made this system fall
short of true comparative negligence; Illinois abandoned it in 1894
with Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. v. Hessions.24 Kansas also recognized
this theory of negligence and allowed a plaintiff to recover under
the same circumstances as prescribed by the Illinois court . 2  In
1883, however, Kansas likewise refused to preserve the system.2 6
Tennessee adopted a rule which went beyond the Illinois and
Kansas rules by providing for an actual apportionment of damages;
i.e., if a plaintiff's negligence were of a remote character only, his
negligence was to be considered in mitigation of damages.2 7  The
old rule, however, which saw a plaintiff whose negligence was a
"proximate cause" barred from recovery, was retained. 28 Neverthe-
less a step toward actual comparative negligence had been made.
Louisiana had, in 1825, passed a comparative negligence statute
which stated:
"The damage caused is not always estimated at the exact
value of the thing destroyed or injured; it may be reduced ac-
cording to circumstances, if the owner of the thing has exposed
it imprudently."
2 9
That provision, however, has been ignored by the Louisiana
courts which have stubbornly clung to the principles of contributory
negligence."e Georgia's comparative negligence statute as construed
by the courts has been so inextricably joined with the confusing
23. The rule is reflected today by the application of the following statutes: N.D.
Rev. Code §1-0116 "There are three degrees of negligence mentioned in this code,
namely, slight, ordinary, and gross. Each of the last two includes any lesser degree or
degrees.", N.D. Rev. Code §1-0117 "Slight negligence shall consist in the want of
great care and diligence, ordinary negligence, in the want of ordinary care and diligence,
and gross negligence, in the want of slight care and diligence.", see Hart v. Hanson, 14
N.D. 570, 105 N.W. 942 (1905); Ga. Code Ann. §3471 (ordinary), §3472 (slight),
§3473 (gross) (1926), see Southern Ry Co. v. Davis, 132 Ga. 812, 65 S.E. 131
(1909); La. Civ. Code §3556 (13) (Dart. 1945); Okla. Stat. tit. 25 §§5, 6 (1951).
Speaking of the doctrine of "degrees of negligence," Prosser says ". . . it has been
condemned by the great majority of writers and rejected by the greater number of courts,
as a distinction vague and impracticable in its nature, unfounded in principle, which
adds nothing but confusion to the already nebulous and uncertain standards which must
be given to the jury," Prosser, Torts 258 (1941).
24. 150 I11. 546, 37 N.E. 905 (1894).
25. Pacific R. Co. v. Houts, 12 Kan. 259 (1873); Sawyer v. Sauer, 10 Kan. 351
(1873).
26. Atcheson, T. & S. R. Co. v. Morgan, 31 Kan. 77, 1 Pac. 298 (1883).
27. Southern Ry. Co. v. Pugh, 97 Tenn. 624, 37 S.W. 555 (1896).
28. Bejach v. Colby, 141 Tenn. 686, 214 S.W. 869 (1919).
29. La. Code art. 2303 (1825); the same provision is contained in La. Civ. Code
art. 2323 (Dart. 1945).
30. See Hillyer, Comparative Negligence In Louisiana, 11 Tulane L. Rev. 112
(1936);,Malone, Comparative Negligence-Louisiana's Forgotten Heritage, 6 La. L. Rev.
125 (1945).
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doctrine of "avoidable consequences"3" as to render any discussion
of it here more academic than beneficial.
Major American Statutory Law
I. United States
South Dakota, Nebraska, Wisconsin and Mississippi are the only
jurisdictions to have enacted comparative negligence statutes
designed to apply to property as well as personal injuries in all
kinds of accidents. Nebraska's statute, adopted in 1913, states:
"In all actions brought to recover damages for injuries to a
person or to his property caused by the negligence of another,
the fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory
negligence shall not bar a recovery when the contributory neg-
ligence of the plaintiff was slight and the negligence of the de-
fendant was gross in comparison, but the contributory negli-
gence of the plaintiff shall be considered by the jury in mitiga-
tion of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory
negligence attributable to the plaintiff; and all questions of neg-
ligence and contributory negligence shall be for the jury."'
In construing the statute it was held that if the negligence of the
plaintiff was found to be more than "slight" in degree, or if the
negligence of the defendant fell short of being "gross," the contribu-
tory negligence of the plaintiff would defeat his recovery. ' As to
what constitutes more than "slight" negligence in Nebraska, the
following are good examples: Where the plaintiff stopped her car
on the defendant's south track while waiting for a train to pass on
the next track and was struck by a train approaching from the west,
it was held that the plaintiff was, as a matter of law, guilty of con-
tributory negligence more than slight under the comparative negli-
gence statute and thus barred from recovery. 34 Where the plain-
tiff, passenger in an automobile, had an opportunity to warn the
driver of an unseen culvert and failed to do so, and the car went off
the culvert, it was held as a matter of law that the plaintiff's negli-
gence was more than slight as compared to the defendant's.
3
5
South Dakota's statute is identical to that of Nebraska,' and has
had a similar history of judicial construction."
31. Turk, Comparative Negligence On The March, 28 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 304, 333
(1950).
32. Neb. Rev. Stat. §25-1151 (1943); Neb. Rev. Stat. §7892 (1913).
33. Morrison v. Scotts Bluff County, 104 Neb. 254, 177 N.W. 158 (1920).
34. Huckfeldt v. Union Pac. R. Co. 154 Neb. 873, 50 N.W.2d 110 (1951).
35. Tomjack v. Chicago & N.W.R.Co. 116 Neb. 413, 217 N.W. 944 (1928).
36. S.D. Laws 1941 c. 160, p. 184.
37. E.g., Kundert v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 70 S.D. 464, 18 N.W.2d 786 (1945)
(example of more than slight negligence); Friese v. Gulbrandson, 69 S.D. 179, 8 N.W.2d
438 (1943) (defines "slight" negligence as being a "quantum of want of such ordinary
care as a reasonable man would exercise under the circumstances.").
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Different from Nebraska and South Dakota, Wisconsin's statute
does not incorporate degrees of negligence. In that state a plain-
tiff need be only less negligent than the defendant to recover dam-
ages. ' The statute reads:
"Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery in an
action by any person or his legal representatives to recover
damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to person
or property, if such negligence was not as great as the negli-
gence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but
any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to
the amount of negligence attributable to the person re-
covering."'3
Though the practical problems in apportioning damages will be
discussed at greater length later, one thing is readily apparent from
a reading of the Wisconsin statute: a plaintiff chargeable with
forty-nine percent of the total negligence can recover fifty-one
percent of his damages; a plaintiff fifty percent negligent recovers
nothing.
The Mississippi statute does not require that a plaintiff, in
order to recover, must be guilty of some degree or kind of neg-
ligence less than the defendant. Thus, a grossly negligent plain-
tiff ("grossly" being used definitively, as "greatly," since Miss-
issippi does not have "degrees" of negligence) 40 was allowed to
recover diminished damages.41 The section is set forth:
"In all actions hereafter brought for personal injuries, or
where such injuries have resulted in death, or injury to prop-
erty, the fact that the person injured, or the owner of the prop-
erty, or person having control over the property may have
been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery,
but damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to
fhe amount of negligence attributable to the person injured,
or the owner of the property, or the person having control over
the property."
42
Thus Mississippi embraces one method; South Dakota and Ne-
braska another, and Wisconsin still another.
II. Canada
All Canadian provinces have adopted the rule of comparative
38. Wis. Stat. §333.045 (1949).
39. Ibid.
40. See Yazoo & M.V.R.R. v. Carrol, 103 Miss. 830, 60 So. 1013 (1913) "This
statute does not deal with, and was not intended to introduce "nto our jurisprudence,
degrees of contributory negligence, but it deals with contributory negligence proper of
every character."
41. Yazoo & M.V.R. Co. v. Williams, 114 Miss. 236, 74 So. 835, 837 (1917).
42. Miss. Code Ann. §1454 (1942).
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negligence either by statute43 or judicial decision 44 -a fact not
generally realized in the United States. Ontario, Alberta and
Saskatchewan have similar statutes, based on what they call a
"Uniform Contributory Negligence Law," although Ontario's Act
does not include the reference to "last clear chance" contained in
the Alberta and Saskatchewan Acts. 45 The Alberta statute, 4  as
even a cursory examination indicates, is far more comprehensive
than any in the United States-especially since it provides for a
single action where multiple parties (later discussed) are involved,
which is something the various state statutes have avoided. One
writer has commented that the references it contains to "last clear
chance," however, are likely to "continue confusing juries."7
Apportionment of Damages
A claimant under a comparative negligence act is entitled to re-
43. Alberta Rev. Stat. c. 116 (1942); Rev. Stat. Man. c. 215 (1940); Rev. Stat.
Ont. c. 103 §3 (1927), amended by Ont. Stat. c. 27 (1930) and Ont. Stat. c. 26 (1931);
Sask. Stat. c. 23 (1944); see also Prosser, supra note 1, at 2 n. 9, wherein he cites
Brit. Col. Rev. Stat. c. 52 (1936), amended by Rev. Stat. c. 68 (1948); New Br. 11ev.
Stat. c. 143 (1927); Nov. Sc. Stat. c. 3 (1926); E.I. Stat. c. 5 (1938).
44. Montreal Tramways Co. v. McAllister, 26 Que. K.B. 174, 34 D.L.R. 565 (1916).
45. Alberta Rev. Stat. c. 116 (1942); Sasks. Stat. c. 23 (1944).
46. Alberta Rev. Stat. c. 116 (1942) reads as follows:
'Proportional Liability For Loss
"2. Where by the fault of two or more persons damages or loss is caused to one or more
of them, the liability to make good the damage or loss shall be in proportion to the
degree in which such person was at fault:
"Provided that,-
(a) if, having regard to all circumstances of the case, it is not possible to
establish the different degrees of fault, the liability shall be apportioned- equally, and
(b) nothing in this section shall operate as to render any person liable for any
loss or damage to which his fault has not been contributed.
Degree of Fault
3. Where such damages have been caused by the default of two or more persons, the
court shall determine the degree in which each was at fault, and where two or "nore
persons are found liable they shall be jointly and severally liable for the fault to the
person suffering loss or damage, but as between themselves in the absence of any con-
tract express or implied, they shall be liable to make contribution to and ,Pdemnify
each other in the degree in which they are respectively found to have been at fault.
4. In any action the amount of damage or loss, and the degrees of fault shall be
questions of fact.
5. Where the trial is before a judge with a jury the judge shall not submit to the jury
any question as to whether, notwithstanding the fault of one party, the other could
have avoided the consequences thereof unless in his opinion there is evidence upon
which the jury could reasonably find that the act or the omission of the latter was
clearly subsequent to and severable from the act or omission of the former so as to
be contemporaneous with it.
6. Where the trial is before a judge without a jury the judge shall not take into con-
sideration any question as to whether, notwithstanding the fault of one party, the
other could have avoided the consequences thereof unless he is satisfied by the evidence
that the act or omission of the latter was clearly subsequent to and severable from
the act or omission of the former so as not to be substantially contemporaneous there-
with.
7. When it appears that a person not a* party to an action is or may be wholly or partly
responsible for the damages claimed, he may be added as a party defendant upon
such terms as are deemed just.
8. This Act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effect its general purpose of
making uniform the laws of those provinces which enact it."
47. Wright, The Law of Torts-1923-1947, 26 Can. Bar Rev. 46, 71 (1948).
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cover his entire damages less an amount which is in the same pro-
portion to the total damages as his own negligence bears to the
combined negligence of both parties. This has been the way the
various damage apportionment statutes have been construed. 48 To
illustrate: A, chargeable with twenty percent of the total negli-
gence, can recover $800 of his $1,000 damages from B who was
guilty of eighty percent of the total negligence. This is a compari-
son of negligence and damages and has prevailed over the theory
which advocates solely a comparison of the negligence of the two
parties.4 9 To illustrate the latter theory using the facts above: A's
negligence of twenty percent is orte-fourth of B's negligence of
eighty percent, so A's damages are diminished by that one-fourth.
Thus A would receive only $750 instead of $800. As indicated, how-
ever, this theory has been rejected.
In applying the principles of apportionment in Nebraska and
South Dakota, the courts have been hampered by the statutory
provisions allowing such apportionment only when the plaintiff's
negligence is "slight" in comparison to the "gross" negligence of
the defendant. Determination of what percent of negligence con-
stitutes more than "slight" so as to preclude the plaintiff's recovery
has been most difficult.5o In most instances, however, any such
difficulties have been resolved in favor of the defendant. It has
been said of this problem in Nebraska: "The great majority of
appeals have resulted in a decision that the contributory negligence
was more than 'slight' and all recovery was barred even though
the defendant's negligence was the greater of the two; so that the
limitation (i.e. the "slight"-"gross" statute) has had the effect of
restricting apportionment to a relatively small number of cases. 51
Thus, although there is apportionment in Nebraska and South
Dakota, the effect of the statutes has been to merely change the
common law definition of contributory negligence to something
more than "slight" negligence. Allowing the plaintiff only slightly
negligent to recover diminished damages has resulted in an incon-
gruous situation: in those states with "degrees" of negligence, a
slightly negligent plaintiff can recover all his damages;5 2 in the
states with comparative negligence acts involving "degrees," a
48. Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Earnest, 229 U.S. 114 (1913); Tendall v. Davis, 129
Miss. 30, 91 So. 701 (1922).
49. Prosser, supra note 1, at 15.
50. One writer has said twenty percent is more than "slight." Grubb, Comparative
Negligence, 32 Neb. L. Rev. 234, 239 (1935).
51. Prosser, supra note 1, at 20.
52. See note 23 supra.
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plaintiff finds his damages diminished!
In Wisconsin, the plaintiff guilty of forty-nine percent of the
total negligence can recover fifty-one percent of his damages-in
view of the statute allowing the less negligent party to recover
apportioned damages. Thus a plaintiff forty-nine percent negligent,
having sustained injuries of $10,000, can recover $5,100. Had the
plaintiff been guilty of one percent more of negligence, however,
he would have recovered nothing. This is a drawback which can-
not be reconciled in theory. As a practical matter, however, it is
extremely seldom that such cases arise; in nearly all cases the
juries have found percentages of fault in simple fractions like one-
third, or in even multiples of five or ten.53
Mississippi gives a party sustaining injury to his property or
person the right to recover some damages irrespective of his negli-
gence. This means, for example, that a man seventy-five percent
negligent can recover twenty-five percent of his loss. Where both
parties are injured, however, both can recover, for the statute
cannot be construed to defeat a counterclaim. In Wisconsin on the
other hand, the party guilty of fifty percent negligence or more
must fail in either an original suit or counterclaim. For example:
in Wisconsin, A who is forty percent negligent sustains $5,000 in
injuries; B, sixty percent negligent, suffers a $3,000 loss. A gets
$3,000 and B gets nothing. In Mississippi A recovers $3,000 but B
in his counterclaim recovers $1,200-so A actually receives only
$1,800. In the usual situation involving injuries to both parties, it
would thus seem that the Mississippi statute provides for equitable
treatment for either party.
The statute could create untoward ramifications where the dam-
ages are not at all akin to the amount of negligence of a party. "
For instance: X is forty percent negligent and sustains a $5,000 loss;
Y who counterclaims is sixty percent negligent and suffers a $10,000
loss. X is entitled to recover $3,000 from Y but Y recovers $4,000
from X. Or assuming X and Y are equally negligent: X pays Y
$5,000 and Y pays X $2,500. The amount of damages evidently
prevails over the amount of negligence and the Mississippi statute
becomes in such instances a "comparative damage" act!
Multiple Parties
The problems of apportionment become more complex when
53. Prosser, supra note 1, at 25, n. 173.
54. The writers found no cases like these and must needs hypothesize.
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three parties, each suffering damage and each negligent, are in-
volved in litigation. The determination of fault of one not a party
to the action, the prospect of a second suit by or against him before
a new jury, and the difficulties of contribution between joint tort-
feasors are examples. Various Canadian statutes, as evidenced by
the Alberta act,5 5 afford a solution by allowing claims arising from
a single transaction to be settled in one suit, as well as joint
contribution.
Suppose that T, A and B collide, each being negligent.56 In Al-
berta T may sue A and B jointly; A and B may file cross claims
against each other for contribution and damages, besides counter-
claims against T for damages. Thus A sues T and B jointly and B
sues T and A jointly for damages, which may result in cross-claims
between T and A for contribution as regards joint liability for B's
damages, and between T and B for A's damages. Subsequent to the
pleading it is found that T, twenty percent negligent, sustained a
$5,000 loss and A, thirty percent negligent, suffered a $4,000 loss,
and B, fifty percent negligent, was injured in the amount of $3,000.
The total damages being $12,000, B's share of the burden is fifty
percent or $6,000, A's burden is $3,600 and T's is $2,400. T receives
the difference between his loss of $5,000 and his share in the burden
of loss ($2,400), or a net of $2,600. A receives the difference be-
tween his loss of $4,000 and burden of $3,600 or $400. B must then
supply the difference between his loss of $3,000 and his share of the
burden in the amount of $6,000, or $3,000. Thus T will get a judg-
ment against B for $2,600 and A against B for $400. This is just one
of the many possible multiple party situations which could arise.
Although the hypothetical case posed above would seem to have
reached a sound conclusion, one should remember that the system
of solution, while practicable in Canada, might not be thus in the
United States-even if the various states adopted statutes allowing
a single action between multiple parties and contribution between
joint tort-feasors.11 The relative success enjoyed in Canadian courts
in regard to solution of multiple party problems likely lies in the
fact that juries are giving way to administration by judges.58 At
55. Note 46 supra.
56. These examples are set forth in Gregory, Loss Distribution By Comparative
Negligence, 21 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1936).
57. Only nine jurisdictions have adopted the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-
feasors Act, Prosser, supra note 1, at 35 n. 224.
58. Prosser, supra note 1, at 34 n. 219.
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any rate the number of appealed cases involving multiple parties
in the United States has been extremely small.59
Special Verdicts
Where the general verdict is employed in comparative negligence
cases it is the custom for juries to return a diminished amount of
damages.60 In Wisconsin a jury is not asked to return a general
verdict, but rather to answer certain questions pertinent to appor-
tionment of damages. The following represents a typical special
verdict interrogatory 1 where a complaint and counterclaim are in-
volved:
"1. In operating his automobile at the time of and immediately
preceding the collision, was the defendant Smith negligent
in respect to speed and control of his car?
2. If you answer Question 1 'yes,' then answer this: Was the
defendant Smith's negligence a cause of the collision?
3. In operating his automobile at the time of. and immediately
preceding the collision, was the plaintiff Jones negligent in
respect to the speed of his car?
4. If you answer Question 3 'yes,' then answer this: Was the
plaintiff Jones' negligence a cause of the collision?
5. In the event you answer all of Questions 1, 2, 3 and 4 'yes,'
then answer this: Was the negligence of the defendant
Smith greater or less than the negligence of the plaintiff
Jones?
6. In the event you answer all of Questions 1 and 2 'yes,' and
3 and 4 'no,' then answer this: What is the full damage
Jones has sustained?
7. In the event you answer all of Questions 1, 2, 3, and 4 'yes'
and 5 'greater,' then answer this: What is the plaintiff
Jones' damage as diminished in the proportion to the
amount of negligence attributable to him?
8. In the event you answered all of Questions 1 and 2 'no,'
and 3 and 4 'yes,' then answer this: What is the full damage
Smith has sustained?
9. In the event you answered all of Questions 1, 2, 3 and 4
'yes,' then answer this: What is the defendant Smith's
damage as diminished in the proportion to the amount of
negligence attributable to him?"
6 2
59. Prosser, supra note 1, at 36. Prosser states that he found only ten such cases,
none of which had very satisfactory results.
60. Campbell, Wisconsin's Comparative Negligence Law, 7 Wis. L. Rev. 223, 229
(1932).
61. Padway, Comparative Negligence, 16 Marq. L. Rev. 3, 23 (1932); see Hamus v.
Weber, 199 Wis. 320, 226 N.W. 392 (1929).
62. Notice that questions 5 and 7 correspond to the statutory requirement that a
plaintiff's negligence must be less than a defendant's to allow a recovery of diminished
damages. Since this is a complaint and counterclaim situation, whichever party is found
less negligent assumes the role of plaintiff.
NOTES
One argument against comparative negligence has related to the
free rein given juries in apportioning damages. Under the special
verdict, however, the court is informed as to what the jury has done;
if the jury errs by disregarding instructions, making mathematical
errors or the like, the court may order a remittitur. It is possible,
too, that the special verdict might displace long and complicated
instructions.
Objections to Comparative Negligence
Opponents of the doctrine of comparative negligence have raised
the following objections to its adoption: (1) Insurance premium
rates would rise since insurance companies would have to pay
damages in many instances where they now pay nothing under
the rule of contributory negligence. (2) It would be almost im-
possible for juries to determine accurately the proportions of negli-
gence of the litigants. (3) The court would have no more control
over the jury than before the adoption of comparative negligence.
(4) Existing common law and statutory law would be greatly
affected.
It is very possible that insurance premium rates would go up
after the passage of a comparative negligence act. A recently corn-
completed ten year study6 3 in Wisconsin reveals that automobile
liability insurance premiums were from seventeen to sixty-four per-
cent higher than in comparable cities or rural areas in Illinois,
Michigan and Iowa. Nebraska insurance rates, on the other hand,
have shown no appreciable difference from surrounding states. It has
been pointed out, however, that Nebraska has had few cases in-
volving apportionment."
Juries very likely would not be able to determine the proportions
of negligence of each party with a great deal of accuracy. Any
apportionment, though, would be more fair than none. Also, jury
members could certainly be as accurate in finding percentages of
negligence as they are omniscient in computing the value of loss of
a limb, for instance! As for claims that the court has no control over
a jury under comparative negligence, the opponents of the doctrine
have not reckoned with the above described special verdict. Even
under a general verdict the duty of the jury to diminish damages
63. Grubb, supra note 50, at 246.
64. Note 51 supra.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
in proportion to the plaintiff's fault is mandatory,"5 and a failure
to consider the plaintiff's fault will result in a remittitur.
6
The statement that the adoption of a comparative negligence act
would affect existing law is probably true-just as it would be true
of any new law. Nevertheless it has been held in Wisconsin that
comparative negligence does not apply in the case of assumption of
risk,01 and suggested that the rules of imputed negligence and
negligence per se through breach of a statute would not be affected
either.68 Also, Nebraska has retained its "last clear chance" doc-
trine. 9 One change in prior existing law appears in Wisconsin,
where it has been said the purpose of the Act was to alter the
doctrine of "degrees" of negligence.- °
No one of the three major comparative negligence statutes seems
entirely satisfactory. Yet Mississippi and Wisconsin have reported
a history of success in applying their Acts. The merit of compara-
tive negligence has been conceded by the great majority of writers.
Certain problems, of course, should be scrutinized by any legisla-
ture considering the adoption of the doctrine. The multiple party
situation, for instance, with its necessary joinder of and contribu-
tion between joint tort-feasors has been neglected in the various
statutes. A provision relating to the equal division of damages be-
tween parties where the proportions of negligence are unascertain-
able might well be desirable.
7
1
These and other improvements on current apportionment statutes
should be carefully considered; a perfunctory comparative negli-
gence act is no better than none at all.
KENNETH MORAN
CHRISTOPHER U. SYLVESTER.
65. See Tendall v. Davis, 129 Miss. 30, 91 So. 701 (1922).
66. Siefferman v. Leach, 161 Miss. 853, 138 So. 563 (1932); Yazoo & M.V.R. Co.
v. Williams, 114 Miss, 236, 74 So. 835 (1917).
67. Shrofe v. Rural Mutual Cas. Ins. Co., 258 Wis. 128, 45 N.W.2d 76 (1950).
68. Campbell, Wisconsin's Comparative Negligence Law, 7 Wis. L. Rev. 222, 235
(1932).
69. Such retention has been called foolish and unnecessary, Gregory, supra note 56,
at 3.
70. Campbell, supra note 68, at 232.
71. See note 46 (2a) supra.
